European tech supply chain loopholes are powering Russian drones

A sweeping cross-border investigation, spearheaded by the Belgian financial daily De Tijd and coordinated with the Kyiv Independent, has exposed the persistent flow of advanced European technology into the Russian military industrial complex. Despite a rigorous sanctions regime intended to starve Moscow’s war machine of critical hardware, Western components, specifically precision sensors and semiconductors, are being routed through intermediaries in Hong Kong and China before surfacing in the wreckage of long-range drones in Ukraine. One striking example detailed in the report involves a tiny Austrian sensor designed for motion control; manufactured in 2024, it was shipped to a Hong Kong entity in July of that year before being recovered from a Russian military drone on the Ukrainian front lines.

Accelerated production

The urgency of closing these loopholes is underscored by the sheer scale of Russia’s aerial campaign. Since the beginning of 2026, Russian forces have launched over 4,600 Shahed strike drones at Ukraine in just one and a half months, the researchers state. This volume is supported by domestic mass-production facilities, such as the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, which aimed to reach a production rate of 3,000 units per month by the end of 2025. Notably, the shift to domestic Russian manufacturing has paradoxically increased the reliance on illicitly acquired Western technology. Analysis reveals that the Geran-2 drones manufactured at Alabuga contain 294 foreign components, representing a massive increase of 162.5 per cent in foreign dependency compared to the 112 parts found in the earlier Kupol plant models.

The compliance gap

The investigation highlights that recent production batches of these drones, deployed in 2025 and 2026, contain fresh components from major industry players like ams-OSRAM, Infineon Technologies, and Bosch. For instance, Ukrainian intelligence identified Infineon transistors manufactured as recently as 2024 inside a Geran-2 drone. While companies like ams-OSRAM assert that their contracts strictly prohibit military use, and Infineon has introduced ‘No Russia’ clauses in distribution agreements, these legal safeguards are failing to stop the grey market trade. The components are funneled through a network of wholesalers in jurisdictions that do not support Western sanctions, complicating enforcement for European manufacturers who have officially ceased all trade with Russia.